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Abstract
The Internet White Pages Service (IWPS) has been slow
to materialise for many reasons. One of them is the
security concerns that organisations have, over allowing
the public to gain access to either their Intranet or their
directory database. The Directory Guardian is a firewall
application proxy for X.500 and LDAP protocols that is
designed to alleviate these fears. Sitting in the firewall
system, it filters directory protocol messages passing into
and out of the Intranet, allowing security administrators
to carefully control the amount of directory information
that is released to the outside world. This paper describes
the design of our Guardian system, and shows how
relatively easy it is to configure its filtering capabilities.
Finally the paper describes the working demonstration of
the Guardian that was built for the 1997 World
Electronic Messaging Association directory challenge.
This linked the WEMA directory to the Nam FLOW-
Paradise Internet directory, and demonstrated some of
the powerful filtering capabilities of the Guardian.
1. Introduction
Experience gained over the last seven years with the
Internet White Pages Directory Service (IWPS), has
shown that universities and other public institutions are
primarily the only organizations that are prepared to
publish their entire directories on the Internet. These are
the only organizations that have joined the
pilot/operational service in any significant numbers. For
example, in the UK NameFLOW-Paradise service [1]
there are 147 organizations listed, the vast majority of
which are universities, research organizations and
publicly funded institutions. Only 21 entries are of
commercial organizations, and of these, the majority are
computer hardware, software and telecommunications
suppliers, or consultancy companies specialising in
computer communications. Only 2 entries are of
commercial organisations whose main businesses are
unrelated to IT, e.g. electricity generation. Similarly
(although to a lesser extent) in the US IWPS there are 258
organisations listed, 126 being universities, research
laboratories or other publicly funded institutions, 82
being commercial organisations whose primary business
is related to IT, with only 50 listings being for other types
of commercial organisation. This contrasts quite
dramatically with the large number of widely varying
types of commercial organisation that have a presence on
the Web. Given that commercial organizations outnumber
universities by over a thousand to one, the former are
conspicuous by their absence in the IWPS. Indeed,
private discussions with a number of commercial
organizations that do operate X.500 or LDAP directories
reveal that these organizations are willing to connect to
the IWPS in order to retrieve directory information from
it, but never to give directory information to it. Those
commercial organizations that have joined the IWPS have
usually only participated in a half hearted way, by adding
no more than a token entry or two. It was this realization,
coupled with the growing demand from commercial
organizations to have a firewall system, running a number
of application proxies, positioned between their corporate
Intranet and the Internet, that lead to the development of
the Guardian DSA. The Guardian is a firewall directory
application proxy, that intercepts all directory protocol
messages between the Internet and the organization’s
Intranet, and only allows through those messages that the
local security policy has sanctioned (see figure 1).
The Guardian DSA development project started in
December 1995, with funding from the EC IV
Framework RTD program. The Guardian was originally
designed to intercept only X.500 [2] protocols i.e. DAP,




Figure 1. Positioning the Guardian Directory Firewall
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of the LDAPv2 protocol [3] in the market place, coupled
with the rapidly expanding market for stand alone LDAP
servers, support for inbound LDAPv2 protocol has also
been added to the Guardian. Support for outbound
LDAPv2 protocol will be added later this year.
2. The Functionality of the Guardian
The Guardian provides two quite distinct services to
the private Intranet1. First and foremost, the Guardian is a
directory application proxy designed to run in a security
firewall system. It ensures the integrity and
confidentiality of directory information on the Intranet,
by only allowing properly authorized directory messages
to flow into and out of the Intranet.
Secondly, the Guardian is the Intranet’s directory
gateway to the outside world, acting as a connectivity
enabler, particularly for standalone LDAP servers. It is in
this second context that organizations running LDAP-
only directories can gain real administrative benefit.
LDAP clients and servers will no longer need to be
continually re-configured to learn about other LDAP
servers on the Internet - they only ever need to know
about their own internal LDAP servers and the Guardian.
All new configuration information is added to the
Guardian, making it a central point for administration and
knowledge management. The Guardian builds up its own
‘world’s eye’ view of the IWPS, and has its own internal
skeleton DIT from which it hangs knowledge references
to other LDAP and X.500 directory servers. If operating
in a purely X.500 context, the knowledge configuration
information is extremely simple (one of the Intranet’s
DSA’s must hold a superior reference to the Guardian,
and the Guardian must hold a superior reference to
NameFlow Paradise). In a mixed LDAP and X.500
context, references to external LDAP servers are also
added to the Guardian.
The remainder of this paper will concentrate on the
security functionality of the Guardian and will describe
its powerful filtering capabilities.
2.1. Filtering Rules
It is important to realize that the Guardian itself does
not hold any directory entry information, but rather holds
a set of rules that dictate which directory information (in
the form of directory requests and responses) can flow
between the Internet and the Intranet. In this respect, it is
quite independent of any access control information that
may be applied internally to the database holding the
directory information. Indeed, it would be possible to
                                         
1 Like any firewall, the Guardian can sit between any  two networks,
protected by different security policies. For the purposes of this paper,
we only consider the case of the publicly accessible Internet
(representing a low security network) and a corporate Int anet
(representing a high security network).
operate the local directory service with little or no local
access control information, thereby giving employees free
access to most of the corporate directory, and to place all
the controls in the Guardian, thereby restricting access to
everyone else (i.e. the hard shell and soft inner model of
security). The rules that drive the Guardian are derived
from the overall security policy of the organization.
The filtering rules that are configured into the Guardian
operate at a number of levels, and are separately
configurable for each direction of information flow. One
configuration file (ToSecurityDomain.ini) contains the
rules for filtering requests originating from the Internet,
and the other configuration file
(FromSecurityDomain.ini) contains the rules for filtering
requests originating from the Intranet. At the highest
level, the security administrator configures which
protocols e.g. LDAPv2 and DAP, are allowed to pass
through the Guardian. At the next level, the security
administrator configures which users are allowed to bind
with these protocols, and below this, which operations
e.g. Search and List, are allowed to pass through the
Guardian. So for example, the integrity of Intranet
directory information can be protected by forbidding
modification operations that originate from the Internet.
At the next level, the administrator configures which
entries are accessible to which operations, and by which
alias names they should be known in the other domain.
Below this, the administrator lists which attribute types
may be included in particular entries, and at the lowest
level, the administrator configures which attribute values
are allowed to pass through the Guardian. Thus
confidentiality of information is assured by preventing
sensitive attributes, entries and even the names of entries
from leaking out to the Internet. All filtering rules have a
default of DENY everything, so that the administrator has
to progressively release the locks in order to let directory
information leave the Intranet.
Because an application proxy has no inherent way of
knowing whether a request has originated from the
Internet or the Intranet, the Guardian is configured with
the names and addresses of trusted directory servers on
both sides of the firewall. Every other directory server is
assumed to be un-trusted and residing on the Internet.
Note that trusted directory servers on the Internet are still
not allowed to receive sensitive information from the
Intranet unless an encrypted communication session is
employed. Finally, the Guardian will never relay requests
within one of the domains, as none of the directory
protocols require this functionality. (A consequence of
this is that the Guardian will never relay a request from
one unknown directory server to another.)
3. User Authentication and Authorization
I  a distributed directory service, a user may bind to
and be authenticated by any directory server, and the
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servers may pass user requests between themselves (in
the X.500 model the DSP is used for this, whereas LDAP
currently does not support such a protocol). A
configuration parameter informs the Guardian of the
minimum level of authentication required for each
directory protocol. If the user meets this minimum level,
the bind will be accepted, otherwise it will be rejected.
In the case where the user does not bind directly to the
Guardian, the Guardian needs to know if a particular user
was authenticated by a trusted directory server, or by an
un-trusted one. Its list of trusted directory servers will tell
it this, and if it transpires that the user was authenticated
by an un-trusted server, then the Guardian removes the
authentication privileges from the user’s request and
treats him or her as un-authenticated before either
rejecting the request or passing the DSP request onto the
other network (see figure 2). If the user was authenticated
by a trusted directory server, then his/her level of
authentication (simple or strong) is believed and passed
on as-is to the other network.
If the user binds directly to the Guardian, then his/her
credentials are checked. If simple (password based)
authentication is used, the Guardian checks the password
against its internal list (the passwords are actually stored
as attributes of user entries with the equivalent
distinguished names). If strong (digital signature based)
authentication is used, the Guardian checks the signature
for authenticity, and also that there is a chain of trust
leading from the public key of a trusted CA to the public
key of the user. In this context, our Guardian is shortly
due to become a certified user of the ICE-TEL CA
infrastructure [4]. If the user’s credentials prove to be
false or untrustworthy, a configuration parameter directs
the Guardian to either reject the bind or downgrade the
session to un-authenticated if this level is acceptable.
In addition to session authentication, individual
directory operations can be digitally signed by a user. The
Guardian will check the digital signatures of signed
operations, retrieving the CRLs as necessary, and if the
signature proves to be false, will either reject or
downgrade the operation according to the security policy
input by the administrator.
3.1.1. Authenticating and Authorising Outgoing
Operations
Some organizations have a requirement to restrict the
number of users who are allowed access to the Internet.
The security administrator has to configure the Guardian
with the distinguished names of users and non-leaf nodes
(typically organizational units) that are allowed access to
the Internet directory. If the Intranet user is not within
this name space his request will be denied. Finally, for
authorized users, the DN of the user can either be hidden
(for example by replacing with a generic name) or made
visibl  in the requests that flow onto the Internet. An
X.500 user will typically bind to his/her local DSA, and
th  request will be chained to the Guardian by this. In
some circumstances the user will need to bind directly to
the Guardian, for example, when using LDAP servers, or
when external directory servers wish to directly
authenticate the user. In these circumstances the Guardian
acts as a proxy user. For these outgoing sessions, the
Guardian performs DAP-DAP chaining or LDAP-DAP
chaining (see figure 2). Outgoing DAP or LDAP to DSP
chaining is not supported. LDAP-LDAP chaining will be
added towards the end of this year, although the same
functionality can be obtained now by using the X.500
Enabl r from Critical Angle [5].
3.1.2. Authenticating and Authorising Incoming
Operations
For incoming sessions, a similar situation applies. The
Guardian is configured with the list of remote users (DNs
of leaf and non-leaf nodes) who are allowed to access the
Intranet. It is also possible to give blanket access by using
the keyword ALL. Because the Guardian is trusted by the
Intranet directory servers, it does not need to act as a
proxy for a remote user. The remote user must be
authenticated by the Guardian before he/she is allowed
access to the Intranet. Consequently the Guardian always
performs standard DAP-DSP chaining or LDAP-DSP
chaining (see figure 2) on incoming operations. LDAP-
LDAP chaining will be added towards the end of this
year to support LDAP stand alone directory systems on
the Intranet.
3.2. Processing of Referrals
It is important that the names and addresses of the
corporate directory servers can be hidden from the
Internet, and that only the address of the Guardian server
is made known publicly. Referrals to Intranet directory
servers would compromise this situation, if they were to
be released to the Internet. Consequently, the Guardian
always acts on referrals to Intranet servers. Similarly for
incoming referrals, there is little point in passing these to
the corporate user, since he has no direct path to the
Internet. Again, the Guardian will always endeavour to
follow incoming referrals, and pass a complete set of
directory information back to the user.











Figure 2. Protocol Chaining Supported by the Guardian
3.3. Configuring the Guardian
One of the key factors in security is KISS (keep it
simple, stupid). If it is extremely complex to configure a
firewall system of any type then it is likely that, sooner or
later, a security administrator will make a mistake which
compromises the security of the Intranet. Consequently,
ease of configuration has been a key design aim for our
Guardian.
The Guardian acts as a 6 stage filter, progressively
refining and reformatting messages that pass through it.
The filters act sequentially, as depicted in Figure 3.
Configuration of the Guardian involves the
specification of two distinct security policies:
· the Intranet Access Policy (this specifies the protocols
and operations that external users can use to access
the internal domain; and the entries, attributes and
values that can be returned in outgoing results); and
· the Internet Access Policy (this specifies the protocols
and operations that internal users can use to access the
external domain; and the entries, attributes and values















Figure 3. The Filters of the Guardian
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To make clear the fact that these two policies are
distinct, two configuration files are specified, and each
contain specifications for all six filters. The syntax and
semantics of each is the same, though it is very likely that
the content will be different e.g. see Appendix 1.
The Guardian configuration uses a "default deny"
principle, which means that anything that is not explicitly
enabled will be disabled. Therefore, if both configuration
files are empty then the Guardian will not allow any
X.500 or LDAP protocols to pass through it.
Additionally, by ensuring that only permitted actions are
specified, rather than prohibited actions, the configuration
file does not contain any prohibited information and so it
can be made public if required.
3.4. Specification of the filters
The syntax for each filter is formally defined (using
BNF) as:
<filter> ::= '[' < filter_name> ']'
      < filter_specs>
<filter_name> ::= 'Protocols'
                  | 'Users'
                  | 'Operations'
                  | 'Entries'
                  | 'Attribute Types'
                  | 'Attribute Values'
<filter_specs> ::= < filter_spec>
   [ < filter_specs> ]
<filter_spec> ::= [ 'FOR' <branch> ] <allow>
<allow> ::= 'ALL'
            | 'ONLY' <refinements>
            | 'NONE'
<refinements> ::= <refinement> [ ','
   <refinements> ]
<refinement> ::= <specification> [ '('
  <qualifier> ')'] [ 'KNOWN AS'
  <modifier> ]
<specification> ::= description of the items
accepted by the filter. The
format is specific to each
type of filter.
<qualifier> ::= a restriction, allowing an item
to be accepted under specified
conditions. The format is
specific to each type of filter.
<modifier> ::= description of the item in the
namespace of the calling domain
(if this is different to the
called domain)
<branch> ::=  boolean condition in terms of
previous filters. The format is
specific to each type of filter.
3.5. Examples
This section gives an example of each type of filter,
and shows some of the capabilities that are possible.
3.5.1. The [protocols] filter
Here, the list of enabled directory protocols is given.
[Prot cols]
  ONLY DAP, LDAP(no authentication), DSP(simple)
Each protocol may take an optional argument
indicating the minimum bind strength of authentication
that is acceptable. In this example, a DAP bind must be
strongly authenticated (this is the default if no bind
strength is mentioned), an anonymous LDAP bind is
acceptable and a DSP bind must have at least a password
(simple).
DISP and DOP are not mentioned, and the Guardian
will block any DISP or DOP binds that it receives.
3.5.2. The [users] filter
This specifies the distinguished names of the users who
are allowed to bind to the Guardian for each of the above
protocols. Distinguished names are specified according to
Internet Draft draft-ietf-asid-ldapv3-dn-03.txt [6] (which
will shortly supersede RFC1779), with the extension that
names may be specified using wild cards. Four forms of
wild card are supported:
1) if an RDN of “at=*” is included in the name then it
will match any single valued RDN of attribute type at,
e.g. cn is used for commonName etc.;
2) if an RDN of “at=**” is included in the name then it
will match any multivalued RDN of where one part of
the RDN is of attribute type at;
3) if an RDN of “*=*” is included then it will match
exactly one RDN of any attribute type; and
4) if an RDN of “**=**" is included then it will match
one or more RDNs, of any attribute type, up to the
end of the name.
[Users]
    FOR Protocol=DAP, LDAP
    ONLY < cn=A J Young,ou=Information Technology
Institute,o=University of Salford,c=GB>
(simple) KNOWN AS < cn=A J
Young,o=University of Salford via
guardian,c=gb>
FOR Protocol=DSP
ONLY <cn=DSA Manager,cn=DSA,o=University of
     Salford,c=gb> (strong)
Each user DN is followed by two optional parameters.
The first indicates the level of authentication that this
particular user or group of users must present. If absent, it
defaults to that specified for the individual protocols, but
can be set to a higher level if the security policy so
directs. A lower value will be ignored (as would be the
case for DAP in the examples above, since the DAP
protocol requires strong authentication).
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The second parameter, starting with keywords
KNOWN AS, allows an alias name for the user to be
used in the other domain.
3.5.3. The [operations] filter
Here, we specify which directory operations will be
allowed to pass through the Guardian for each group of
users.
[Operations]
   FOR  User=<cn=DSA Manager,cn=DSA,o=University
   of Salford,c=gb>
   ONLY READ(unsigned),LIST(unsigned 20, signed
   100),COMPARE
Each operation may take an optional argument
indicating whether or not it may be unsigned in order to
pass through the Guardian. The LIST and SEARCH
operations additionally can specify an optional argument
giving the maximum number of entries that may be
returned in the results (this may be different for signed
and unsigned operations). The default value for this is
one entry. In this example, READ may be unsigned,
COMPARE must be signed (this is the default if no
signature requirement is mentioned), and LIST may
return more entries if the operation is signed.
SEARCH and the modification operations are not
mentioned here, and so these operations would not be
allowed to pass through the Guardian.
3.5.4. The [entries] filter
Here, we specify which entries will be allowed to pass
through the Guardian. In addition to specifying which
entries can pass through, it is also possible to specify
what their names should be known as in the external
domain i.e. a form of aliasing. This is especially useful if
an organisation wishes to protect its Intranet DIT
structure from being visible on the Internet.
[Entries]
    ONLY < cn=A J Young,ou=Information Technology
Institute,o=University of Salford,c=GB>
KNOWN AS <cn=A J Young,o=University of
Salford via guardian,c=GB>,
         < cn=D W Chadwick,ou=Information
Technology Institute,o=University of
Salford,c=GB> KNOWN AS <cn=D W
Chadwick,o=University of Salford via
guardian,c=GB>
In the above example, only two entries (for the authors
of this paper) may pass through the filter, and these will
be visible in the other domain with their organisational
unit affiliations stripped off.
3.5.5. The [attribute types] filter
Here we specify which attribute types will be allowed
to pass through the Guardian.
The second part of the example is needed if the
administrator wishes to over-ride the default-deny stance
and say that all attribute types can be released for all
allowed entries other than those explicitly named in the
first part of the example.
[Attribute Types]
    FOR Entry=<cn=*,ou=Information Technology
    Institute,o=University of Salford,c=GB>
    ONLY objectClass, commonName, surname,
    title, postalAddress, postalCode,
    telephoneNumber, userid, rfc822Mailbox,
    roomNumber, userClass, userPassword,
    favouriteDrink
    FOR Entry=*
    ALL
3.5.6. The [attribute values] filter
Here we specify, for each attribute type, the values
which are allowed to pass through the Guardian. The
example here specifies that all direct dial telephone
numbers will be made available in international format,
whether they are stored in international, national or
internal format. Non-direct dial extensions (these do not
start with a 5) will not be released.
The second part of the example is needed to over-ride
th  efault-deny stance and say that, for all other allowed
attribute types, all values can be released.
In the specification of a value, a * may be used to
match any number of characters, and a ? to match a single
character.
 [Attribute Values]
    FOR Attribute Type=telephone number
    ONLY "+44 161 745 *",
        "0161 745 *" KNOWN AS "+44 161 745 *"
         "5????" KNOWN AS "+44 161 745 ????"
    FOR Attribute Type=*
    ALL
3.6. Specification of local names
The configuration file allows the Guardian
administrator to define local names for groups of users,
and to specify the DNs of users and entries using these
short name forms. This makes the specification much
easier for the administrator, since he/she does not have to
re-enter lots of DNs. As well as allowing for more
readable specifications, the mechanism also provides a
single place where the names of the group members is
defined, thereby making maintenance and audit easier.
Local names are defined in an extra section of the tailor
file, which is usually located after the filters (though it
can be located anywhere). They are specified as follows:
[Local naming]
    NAME <distinguished name> ... KNOWN AS
    <local name>
The short local name must not contain a comma, an =
or a *.
The distinguished name may contain wild cards, as
defined earlier in the document. Any number of names




    NAME < cn=A J Young, ou=Information
Technology Institute, o=University of
Salford, c=GB> , <cn=D W Chadwick,
ou=Information Technology Institute,
o=University of Salford, c=GB> KNOWN AS
<guardian developers>
This allows the Guardian administrator to say:
    [Users]
    ONLY <guardian developers>(strong)
to restrict use of the Guardian to just the named people,
or to say:
    [Operations]
    FOR User=<guardian developers>
    ALL
    FOR User=*
    ONLY Read,Compare,List
to give the named people higher privileges than other
users. If staffing details change then the Guardian filters
do not need to be changed.
3.7. Other configuration information
Various other parameters are supported in the
configuration files. Briefly these are: a parameter to
control the amount of logging, whether to downgrade or
reject failed authentications, the list of trusted DSAs, and
the action to take if a request attempts to retrieve
restricted information (remove from result or return
error).
4. Piloting the Guardian
The Guardian was successfully piloted at the EMA
meeting in Philadelphia in April 1997, and again at the
EEMA meeting in Maastricht in June 1997. It is now
permanently operational, and demonstrable from our Web
site [7].
Because the Internet White Pages Service and
NameFLOW-Paradise service use Quipu based X.500
products, that incorporate Internet defined extensions to
the X.500 1988 protocols [e.g.8], WEMA decided to set
up a parallel infrastructure using products that conform to
the LDAPv2 protocol and 1993 X.500 standards. The
Guardian is quite happy to talk to both flavours of X.500
products, and in fact does so in our demonstration, with
the Salford directory (representing the Intranet) being
held in a Quipu DSA, and the WEMA directory
infrastructure (representing the Internet) being held in
1993 conformant DSAs.
If we were to connect the University of Salford
directory to the EEMA infrastructure via the Guardian in
the conventional way (Figure 1), then it would only be
possible to see a subset of the information contained in
the University of Salford directory, as directed by our
security policy. Furthermore, it would not be possible to
verify the full protection effects of the Guardian, because
no-one from the Internet would have access to the
unfiltered directory. Consequently, we have built a
configuration that allows users to see both behind and in
front of the firewall, so that they can see for themselves
the effect of the Guardian. To do this, we have added
subordinate knowledge references to the EEMA GB DSA
to point to both the University of Salford operational
DSA, and the University of Salford Guardian (see figure
4). By displaying the contents of the University of
Salford operational DSA, one will see the entire directory
of the University of Salford. By displaying the contents
of the University of Salford via the Guardian DSA, one
will only see the entries that our security policy has








Figure 4. The Configuration of our Demonstrator
4.1. The University of Salford Directory
There are approximately 26,000 entries held in the
University of Salford directory, and these are all held in a
single Quipu DSA. The Salford directory tree is
structured with departments (organizational units) below
the University of Salford entry, and people below the
departments, as shown in Figure 5.
All people within the University of Salford have access
to all of this information from the corporate Intranet. The
Guardian has been configured so that the WEMA public
directory can only see 3 person entries in the University
of Salford directory, and cannot see any of the
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Figure 5. The University of Salford’s DIT
C=GB
O=University of Salford via Guardian
CN= person’s name
Figure 6 The University of Salford’s DIT visible
to the public
This shows the powerful filtering effects of the
Guardian, in that not only can it remove leaf entries and
subtrees from public view, but it can also remove non-
leaf nodes, thereby appearing to alter the structure of the
corporate DIT. Finally, the Guardian can rename non-leaf
nodes, thereby allowing the private directory and the
public directory to use different naming conventions (for
example, in our demonstration, the internal name
O=University of Salford, is given the name O=University
of Salford via Guardian in the public directory). The
Guardian thus allows you to gateway between two DITs
with different name-spaces. Such capabilities are not
normally provided by standard access control lists.
4.2. Attribute Filtering by the Guardian
The three entries that are visible via the Guardian have
had some of their attributes filtered from public view. If
you read the contents of the entry:
CN=D W Chadwick, OU=Information Technology
Institute, O=University of Salford, C=GB
via the operational University of Salford DSA, you will
see that the Email address, Fax number, Telex number
and Telephone number attributes are all present.
However, if you read the contents of the entry:
CN=D W Chadwick, O=University of Salford via
Guardian, C=GB
via the Guardian, you will see that the Telex number and
Fax number attributes have been filtered out. It is also
possible to filter particular attribute values, if your
security policy so requires.
4.3. Performance
A limited number of performance measurements have
been carried out in our laboratory, in which the Salford
DIT was searched for SN=Chadwick, both directly and
via the Guardian. These have revealed that the deviation
in real time performance (as seen by the user agent), for
both access routes, is as great as the delay in going via the
Guardian. Specifically, for 20 requests sent via both
routes, the average time and standard deviation for a
response was 15.5±6  secs for a direct request and
20.3±7.5 secs for a request sent via the Guardian. We are
currently performing additional tests to determine how
much of the delay is caused simply because we are
chaining via another directory server, and how much is
actually caused by the filtering functionality of the
Guardian.
5. Conclusion
The provision of a Guardian directory application
proxy should give organisations that wish to publish only
a part of their corporate directory, the confidence to
connect their corporate directory service to the Internet
White Pages Service, safe in the knowledge that they can
fully filter the amount of directory information that leaves
their domain. The Guardian implementation built at
Salford University provides such a functionality.
Furthermore, a major design goal has been to ensure that
the two configuration files, used to input the
organisation’s security policy into the Guardian, are both
easy to understand and secure in the way that they
operate, using the default deny principle.
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Appendix 1. Example Configuration Files
# This is an example ToSecurityDomain.ini file,
# specifying the Intranet Access Policy used in
# the EEMA demonstration Guardian (enhanced to
# take account of some new features that are not
# currently implemented)
# This   file   specifies   the  protocols   and
# operations  that  external  users  can  use to
# access the internal domain; and the entries /
# attributes / values  that  can be returned in







ONLY Read (unsigned), List (unsigned 100, signed
100), Compare(unsigned)
FOR User=*
ONLY Read (signed), List (signed 100),
Compare(signed)
[Entries]
ONLY <andrew> KNOWN AS <cn=A J Young,
o=University of Salford via guardian, c=GB>,
    < chad> KNOWN AS <cn=D W Chadwick,
o=University of Salford via guardian, c=GB>
[Attribute Types]
FOR Entry=<**=**, o=University of Salford,c=gb>
ONLY objectClass, commonName, surname, title,
postalAddress, postalCode, telephoneNumber,
userid, rfc822Mailbox, roomNumber, userClass,
userPassword, favouriteDrink
FOR Entry=*




















ONLY +44 161 745 *,
     0161 745 * KNOWN AS +44 161 745 *,
     5???? KNOWN AS +44 161 745 ????
FOR Attribute Type=*
ALL






QUERY PROHIBITED ITEM return error
[Local Naming]
NAME <cn=A J Young, ou=Information Technology
Institute, o=University of Salford, c=GB> KNOWN
AS <andrew>
NAME  <cn=D W Chadwick, ou=Information
Technology Institute, o=University of Salford,
c=GB> KNOWN AS <chad>
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# This  is  an  example  FromSecurityDomain.ini
# file, specifying the  Internet  Access  Policy
# used  in  the  EEMA  demonstration   Guardian
# (enhanced to take account of some new features
# not currently implemented)
# This  file   specifies   the   protocols  and
# operations  that  internal  users  can use to
# access the external domain; and the entries /
# attributes / values  that can be  returned  in




ONLY <c=GB,o=University of Salford, ou=
Information Technology Institute, cn=A J Young>
(simple) KNOWN AS < c=gb,o=University of Salford









# End of filters - the following items are basic
configuration items
[Trusted DSAs]
NAME <cn=University of Salford DSA 1,c=gb>
(simple)
[General]
LOGGING "level=exception level=notice
file=guardian/ internet.log"
AUTHENTICATION downgrade
